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Accident is one of the big issues that occur repeatedly in the process industries 
today though there is numerous application of the variety safeguarding measures that 
have been introduced. Equipment failure is identified as one of the root causes of these 
major accidents. One of the established standards that address the above issue is 
Mechanical Integrity (MI) element of Process safety Management System (PSM) 29 
CFR 1910.119 (j). It is believed that most of the process industries already recognized 
the standard but unavailability of effective technique to implement the PSM elements 
had delay the implementation of this standard. This research study is conducted to 
introduce a systematic technique to implement MI elements of PSM in process 
industries to achieve high level of safety in workplace as well as to prevent any accident. 
This study covered analysis of requirements of the standard, development of framework 
and prototype tool as well as concept validation through case study from real process 
plant data. Implementation of this technique will help employer to control the hazards 
and minimize process hazards that could prevent major accidents such as fire, explosion 
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1.1  BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
 
Most of the reported accidents in industries resulted from human factor. Humans 
are the one who govern and accomplish all of the activities necessary to control the risk 
of accidents. Human not only cause accidents (unintentionally) by making errors related 
to the process itself, but they also contribute to error by creating deficiencies in the 
design of the equipment and the implementation of management systems. Because of 
that, it may contribute to the equipment failure and consequently lead to accident. 
Process safety is all about controlling risk of failures and errors; the concern of 
controlling risk is primarily about reducing the risk from human. All elements in Process 
Safety Management (PSM) in return help to reduce the chance of human error or else 
help to limit the impact of human error in order to prevent catastrophic releases of 
hazardous substances that lead to any accident.  
 
PSM standard has 14 specific interrelated management elements that need to be 
implemented to prevent catastrophic releases of hazardous substances. These include 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR), Operating 
Procedures (OP), Mechanical Integrity (MI), Process Safety Information (PSI), and 
Management of Change (MOC), Training, Hot Work Permit, Employee Participation, 
Contractors, Incident Investigation, Emergency Planning & Response, Trade Secrets and 
Compliance Audits. This project is focusing only on Mechanical integrity (MI) 29 CFR 
1910.119(j) element of PSM. Though PSM has been introduced, in particular time, the 
accidents still happen in the process industries. Deficiency in implementation of the MI 
element of PSM had contributed to the highlighted issue. Thus there is a need to develop 
a systematic system for easy implementation of MI element in order to provide a safe 




1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
1.2.1 Problem Identification 
 
Unexpected thing never alarmed us. Many cases of unexpected releases of 
flammable liquids and gases, reactive materials, and toxic in processes that involve 
highly hazardous chemicals that killed workers and cause injuries have been reported for 
many years. Regardless of the industry that uses these highly hazardous chemicals, there 
is a possibility for an accidental release at any time if they are not properly managed and 
controlled. In return, it creates the possibility of disaster. Before it brings in the 
unwanted tragedy, prevention is better than cure. 
 
PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 has been introduced in the process industries to ensure 
the process facilities that have hazardous chemicals on site are operated safely. 
However, a major challenge is unavailability of easy technique for industries to 
implement PSM and comply with the requirements. PSM standard was not properly 
understand and followed by employer. In addition the identified hazards information 
was not accessible by effected personnel. Thus the implemented safety program was 
misleading to control and minimize the hazards and risk within process plant. 
.  
 
1.2.2 Significance of the Project 
 
This project is significant to assist the process industries in order to have a better 
implementation technique of PSM in preventing the catastrophic accidents that lead to 
loss of life, significant property loss, as well as damage to the environment. The 
introduced well-structured technique hopefully can benefit the end users priority to the 






1.3  OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
 
The objectives of the project are stated as below: 
i. To analyze the requirements for Mechanical Integration (MI) 29 CFR 
1910.119(j) 
ii. To establish framework of MI 
iii. To develop prototype tool for easy explanation and implementation based on the 
framework and model. 
iv. To conduct case studies for concept validation. 
 
1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY 
 
This project is a comprehensive research study about the development of Process 
Safety Management System (PSMS) for implementation in process industries focusing 
on the MI element of PSM. Analyze on the MI of PSM has been done through the study 
of the requirements and identifying a necessary documentation. This is followed by 
development of framework and model for the focused element. Then, the develop 
concept is transformed into computer database prototype system. To prove the validity 
of the system, case study is conducted using real process plant data. 
 
 
1.5 RELEVANCY &FEASIBILITY OF THE PROJECT 
 
The project is relevant to the process industries out there as the result that will be 
yielded from this project can be utilized by the industries to enhance the safety 
management system by implementing the introduced techniques approach to the 
elements of PSM in order to reduce the frequency of accidents in the workplace and 
perhaps to prevent the world's worst industrial disaster involving life of workers like one 
that occur in Bhopal, India. It is believed that with a strong will, this project is able to 






Major accidents have been defined as “an occurrence such as a major emission, 
fire or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation 
of any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health and/or the 
environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving 
one or more dangerous substances” [1]. The recent major accidents or disasters that have 
been reported include the 1984 Bhopal, India which resulting in more than 2,000 deaths; 
the October 1989 Phillips Petroleum Company, Pasadena, TX incident resulting in 23 
deaths and 132 injuries; the July 1990 BASF, Cincinnati, OH incident resulting in 2 
deaths, and the May 1991 IMC, Sterlington, LA, incident resulting in 8 deaths and 128 
injuries [2]. 
 
Definitely, there are the reasons behind all the accidents that happen in the 
process industries. Most of the studies stated that the main factors that lead to major 
accidents are equipment failure [3, 4] and human factor [5]. Figure 1 shows the 
immediate causes of accidents notified to Major Hazards Bureau in petrochemical sector 
for the 17 years period from 1985 to 2002. It represented that equipment failure was the 
major cause of the accidents with 44%. 40% of the major accidents notified have causes 
either exclusively (19%) or partially (21%) attributed to human factor. Natural 
phenomena like floods or thunderstorms and environment conditions like low 
temperature or humidity were the 7% of causes either directly (3%) or in combination 
with equipment failure (4%). In 9% of the cases, immediate causes have not yet been 
defined [6]. Same figure which indicate that equipment failure contribute to the highest 










Figure 2: Different causes of failures leading to reported petroleum incidents  
(1994-2009). 
 
In response to the major  accidents that repeatedly occur worldwide, 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) has issued the Process Safety 
Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR 1910.119) in 
1992 to help ensure safe and healthful workplaces. PSM is known to be a collection of 
management systems and their implementation with the purpose of controlling the risk 
6 
 
of major accidents; PSM focuses on preventing the accidents that originate from process 
hazards such as release and explosion of flammable gases or liquids, release of toxic, 
etc. [7]. 
 
In addition, a major accident in an industrial plant or in the transportation of a 
hazardous material is always originated by a loss of containment. The loss of 
containment possibly due to the catastrophic collapse or the explosion of a tank, the 
rupture of a pipe, a leak trough a flange, a hole or a safety valve, etc. [8]. Both 
equipment failure and loss of containment related to one of the elements of PSM which 
is Mechanical Integrity (MI). MI is the programming implementation of activities 
necessary to ensure that important equipment will be suitable for its intended application 
throughout the life of operation [9]. OSHA believes it is important to maintain the 
mechanical integrity of critical process equipment to ensure it is designed and installed 
correctly and operates properly. There is a great advantage for industries to comply with 
PSM regulation to prevent those accidents. 
 
The PSM Standard states in 29 CFR 1910.119(j) (1) that the MI element is 
applicable to the following process equipment: i) Pressure vessels and storage tanks , ii) 
Piping systems (including piping components such as valves), iii) relief and vent 
systems and devices, iv) emergency shutdown systems, v) controls (including 
monitoring devices and sensor, alarms, and interlocks) and vi) pumps. The other 5 sub 
elements of MI that should be address are written procedures, training, inspection and 
testing, equipment deficiencies and Quality assurance (QA). 
 
Nevertheless, the results of PSM audits show that MI receiving a large number of 
citations at most facilities which indicate that it has been a difficult element facility to 
implement. In some cases, it has been the last PSM element to be fully addressed [10]. 
Chemical national emphasis program (NEP) has tabulated the most cited PSM elements 
as in Table 1 below [11]. It shows that the MI element of PSM is the most frequently 
violated. The data gives indication that inadequate technique was apply in the industry 
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which contribute to the violation of the MI element. It is undeniable that MI programs 
have already existed in the process industry but there is some lacking where the 
complete integrated MI management system programs that address all of the sub-
elements of MI cannot be achieved. Furthermore, the performance-based regulatory and 
voluntary consensus of the MI element of the PSM standard presents their requirements 
in very broad and hard-to-interpret language [12]. 
 
 




Most of the industries attempt to enhance the MI program but the problem is 
there is no proper technique introduced to them to establish and implement the program. 
For example, one case study has outlined the process used at the Super Octanos/ MTBE 
for the development of a highly successful MI. The major goal of the initiative was to 
develop an effective, reliable and practical mechanical integrity program in support of 
the company's overall asset management objectives.  However, they have faced the 
major challenges which included the lack of existing guidelines for the development of a 




Typically, there are systems that already existed in managing the MI program. 
Computerized maintenance management system (CMMS) is one of the computer 
systems that are being used to manage the MI program in the industries [9]. CCMS used 
to accomplish the individual Inspection, testing and preventive maintenance (ITPM) task 
and equipment repair and replacement task. Besides, CCMS also frequently used to 
assist facilities with the QA of spare parts and maintenance material. Other additional 
features of CMMS that helpful are failure coding, cost tracking and report generation. In 
addition to the CCMS, there is other software that used to manage the aspect of MI; 
training management software, document management software and risk management 
software.   
 
Besides, a number of sophisticated methods have been developed for managing 
the inspection program in the process industry since 1990s. These methods are known as 
risk-based inspections (RBIs) [14]. RBI method estimates a risk value for each 
equipment item resulting from the combination of the consequences of the failure and 
likelihood of the failure. RBI also required an adequate risk analysis. It should be 
implemented by a professional team and will not work well and not yield any advantage 
if the personnel are unskilled. Unfortunately, RBI gives benefits to the major industries 
only and not suitable to minor one since it is difficult to implement when there is 
unskilled personnel and poor understanding and evaluation of the risks. Furthermore 
CCPS 2006 [9] stated that RBI is not applied to other MI program activities. 
 
The existent of systems in industries focus on certain sub-standard of the MI 
requirements only. Thus, a system that covers all the subs-standards in the MI should be 
implemented in a better way in order to comply with the PSM requirements since none 






















Conduct case study for concept validation (FYP II)  
Develop prototype tool (FYP II)  
Develop model based on the framework 
Develop framework/ process flow based on the element 
Study the standard requirements of the element 
Assigned for project 








Stage I (Compliance with PSM standard) 
 
Basically, the project is started with analyzing the requirements of the MI 
element of PSM standard. Analyzing MI requirements of PSM is important to discover 
the minimum requirements to comply with the MI standard. Once the requirements are 
properly interpreted, the framework or process flow has been developed compliance 
with the MI of PSM regulation. The framework illustrates step by step process that need 
to be perform according to the MI requirements. 
 
 
Stage II (Development of PSMS for MI) 
 
A model has been created using Microsoft Office Excel that represents the 
framework. Instead of Microsoft Excel, other computerized software which is Microsoft 
Office Access has been used in development of the database prototype tool for easy 
explanation of the developed concept and implementation of MI element. In this 
research study, Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is used as the basis to 
manage and trace the data related to MI. Using P&ID as an interface for this technique 
also could enhance end users' acceptance since it is commonly used in a process plant.   
 
 
Stage III (Concept validation of study) 
 
A case study was conducted to optimize and verify the develop system. A prove 
for the concept validation is required in encouraging the end users to implement this 
system. To have more impactful results in validating the concept, the real data from the 







3.2 TOOLS REQUIRED 
 
The main tools required in completing the project are as the following: 
i. Microsoft Office  
This software is used to present the framework and for the purpose of report 
writing. 
 
ii. Microsoft Office Excel 
This software is used for the development of the model as the main interface 
according to the framework/ process flow of the MI element.  
 
iii. Microsoft Office Access 
For the purpose of the database prototype system development, this software has 
been applied and used instead.  This software is more practicable as it can import 
or link directly to data stored in other applications and databases. It is also 

















3.3 GANTT CHART & KEY MILESTONES 
 
For Final Year Project I (FYP I), the main activities are focusing on the searching for related resources for PSM 
implementation. Other than that, it is aiming on the 2 objectives of the project which are analyzing of the requirements of MI 
PSM as well as development of framework and the model. Table 2 shows the suggested milestone for the first semester of Final 
Year Project. 
 
Table 2: Gantt chart for semester 1 
Activities / Week 
May June July August 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
First meeting with coordinator and 
supervisor 













       
Preliminary research work 
(background, literature review, 
methodology) 
             
Submission of Extended   
Proposal Defence 
             
Proposal  Defence              
Analyze the requirements of the 
MI element 
             
Development of  framework and 
model for MI 
             
Submission of Interim Draft 
Report 
             
Submission of Interim Report              
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For second semester, the project is more details on developing the prototype tool using Microsoft Access and concept 
validation through the case study conducted from real process plant data. Table 3 represents the Gantt chart for second 
semester. 
 
Table 3: Gantt chart for second semester 
Activities / Week 
September October November December  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Develop prototype tool 
using Microsoft Access   













        
Collect industrial data               
Validate case study               
Submission of progress 
report 
              
Project work expansion 
 Analyze case study 
 Optimize prototype  
              
Pre-EDX               
Submission of draft report               
Submission of dissertation 
(soft bound) 
              
Submission of technical 
paper 
              
Oral presentation               
Submission of project 
dissertation (hard bound) 






RESULTS & DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR MI OF PSM 
 PSM standard has outlined 6 sub-elements of MI that need to be applied by 
process industries in managing the ongoing integrity of the industries. Table 4 shows the 
requirements of the MI element.  
 
Table 4: Requirements of Mechanical Integrity (MI) element based on Process Safety 
Management (PSM) standard 
Sub – elements Requirements 
Application 
CFR 1910.1199 (j) (1)(i-vi) 
- Apply to: 
i. Pressure vessel & storage tank 
ii. Piping systems 
iii. Relief and vent systems and device 
iv. Emergency shutdown systems 
v. Controls (alarm, interlocks) 
vi. Pumps 
Written procedures 
CFR 1910.1199 (j) (2) 
- Should be established and implemented by 
employer to maintain on-going integrity.  
Training for process 
maintenance activities 
CFR 1910.1199 (j) (3) 
- Employer shall train each employee involved in  
o an overview of that process  
o  its hazards 
o  Procedures applicable to job task 
to assure that the employee can perform the 
job tasks in a safe manner 
15 
 
Inspection & testing 
CFR 1910.1199 (j) (4)(i-iv) 
i. Should be performed on process equipment 
ii. Procedures follow RAGAGEPs 
iii. Consistent frequency of inspections & test 
iv. Proper documentation 
1) Date of inspection 
2) Inspectors name 
3) Serial no. of equipment 
4) Inspection methods 
5) Inspection results 
Equipment deficiency  
CFR 1910.1199 (j) (5) 
- Correct deficiency before further use or in a safe 
and timely manner 
Quality assurance 
CFR 1910.1199 (j) (6)(i-iii) 
i. In the construction of new plant/equipment, 
assure that equipment as it is fabricated is 
suitable for process application. 
ii. Appropriate check and inspection performed 
during installation. 
iii. Assure maintenance materials, spare parts and 















4.2 FRAMEWORKS FOR MI OF PSM 
 
4.2.1 Compliance with Mechanical Integrity (MI) 29 CFR 1910.119(j).  
 
The frameworks of the project indicate that the process flow that need to be 
addressed in order to achieve the minimum requirements of the MI element of PSM 
standard. By having these frameworks, they provide a correct pathway for the 
development of model or prototype of the proposed technique. The framework in Figure 
3 summarized the important information and strategy necessary to implement MI as 
required by CFR 1910.119(j).  
 
As refer to the framework of MI implementation strategy, for the first step we 
need to check the application of the process equipment. Then, the equipment has to be 
identified whether it is existing or new equipment. For the existing equipment it has to 
follow CFR 1910.119(j) (2) until CFR 1910.119(j) (5). Meanwhile for new equipment, it 
has to pass the Quality Assurance requirement first before it can be installed in the plant. 













Figure 3: Framework of Mechanical Integrity (MI) Management based on CFR 1910.119 (j) 
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4.2.2 Using P&ID as Foundation for Data Management  
 
P&ID is used as a foundation in managing and tracking the data for the concept 
validation of the MI implementation. For the ease of accessing the required data, the 
P&ID is divided into several nodes. The node is divided into the intended function of the 
unit. In the node itself, there will be several equipment or streams that need to be 
considered. Choose an equipment or stream and then perform the MI program. Once the 
information regarding the equipment or stream within the selected node has been 
reviewed or updated, the end users might choose another node. This process will 
continue until all nodes in the P&ID are completed.  
 
The significant of using P&ID is that it prevents missing of data or MI program 
for the related equipment. Figure 4 shows the frameworks on how to apply or utilize 






Figure 4: Framework of Mechanical Integrity (MI) using P&ID as a basis for the study. 
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4.3 CASE STUDY 
 
For Final Year Project II (FYP II), the work continued with the development of 
prototype database management system named Mechanical Integrity Management 
System (MIMS) using Microsoft Access. For concept validation and demonstration, 2 
case studies have been conducted utilizing real process plant data from refinery X 
involving existing and new equipment.  
 
4.3.1  Case Study 1: Activated Carbon filter (V-5)  
 
For demonstration, a case study for Activated Carbon Filter (V-5) using MIMS is 
illustrated. As referred to Figure 4, the P&ID is divided into several nodes according to 
design intention. Figure 5 shows the selected nodes for this case study, which consist of 
Activated Carbon Filter (V-5). The function of the V-5 is to remove free chlorine or 
organic compound in the water from the Feed Water Buffer Tank (T-5). The organics 
should be removed from the water to prevent common organic acids from reacting with 
the chlorine to form trihalomethanes which is a class of known carcinogens. The outlet 





















Figure 5: Part of overall P&ID diagram showing the Activated Carbon Filter (V-5) 
Node 1 







4.3.1.1     MI application 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(1)(i-vi) 
 
Under 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(1) provision, MI element is applicable to 6 process 
equipment including pressure vessel and storage tanks, piping systems, relief and vent 
systems and devices, emergency shutdown systems, controls, and pumps. However, 
when the standard mentions pressure vessels and storage tank, it no doubt that it 
included much more. Surely the standard means to include reactor, filters, furnaces, 
boilers, other heat exchangers, knock-out pots, and other smaller miscellaneous 
containers common within the industry though they were below 15 psig (104 KPa 
gauge) or not a storage tank [15]. Hence, the prototype has included the name of 
equipment as well as the equipment code as there would be different equipment under 
the designated sub-standard. Figure 6 shows the MI Application interface for MIMS 
which includes „Sub-standard‟, „Application‟, „Equipment name‟ and „Equipment code‟ 
columns. 
 
MI application is the main interface for the MIMS since it is the first requirement 
that needs to be checked regarding MI of the PSM. In this case, Activated Carbon Filter 
with tag no.V-5 is categorized under Pressure vessel and storage tank, thus it is obliged to 
comply with 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(1)(i). 
 
 
Figure 6: MI Application in MIMS for V-5 
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In MIMS, MI data management is comes afterward once MI application is 
determined. This is to make sure that the process equipment satisfies the entire 
requirement of the PSM standard. Based on the framework of structured technique in 
Figure 3, it is possible that all the sub-standards of MI can be assessed and monitored 
easily using data captured through computerized system that can be stored in a 
centralized database. MI Data management interface shows the overall status of the 
compiled data of selected node. Figure 7 illustrates the MI data management interface  
which consists of „Sub-standard‟, „Description‟, „Complete‟, „Incomplete‟ and 
„Remarks‟ column.  
 
 
Figure 7: MI data management in MIMS for V-5 
 
In this case, only one out of six sub-standards of MI is not complying due to data 
for training is not completed. If the sub-standards are complying as outlined by PSM, 
end users can hit the „Complete‟ column and otherwise they can tick in „Incomplete‟ 
column with the issue as refer to „Remark‟ column. From here, the gap that hinders the 
compliance to the standard is identified and further action can be initiated in order to 
comply with all the MI requirements. It shows that this systematic checklist system 
capable in identifying the gap and the end users would always be alerted of insufficient 
MI information that need to be compiled to ensure the accomplishment of hazards 
control and risk reduction program. 
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4.3.1.2     MI Written Procedures 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(2) 
 
MI procedures should be written in adequately detail in order to maintain the on-
going integrity of process equipment throughout its life span. Procedures must be there 
to control overwhelming safety critical systems. Before the system can be taken out of 
service for any length of time, there must be appropriate authority, communication and 
detailed contingency planning to avoid any unwanted accident happen [15]. MI written 
procedures can be managed by allocating respective personnel to provide the procedures 
document sheet for easy reference to employee in handling any MI activity in the 
process plant. Figure 8 shows the MI written procedures in MIMS consists of 
„Document name‟, „Document no.‟, „Review date‟, „Verified by, „Evidence location‟, 
„Complete ‟, „Incomplete‟, „Remarks‟, „Action by‟ and „ Due date‟ columns.  
 
„Document Name‟, Document no.‟ and „Review Date‟ in conjunction with 
„Verified by‟ information are needed to ensure the accuracy of the documented 
procedures. The written procedures have to be reviewed so that the latest or updated 
procedures are kept on the track for affected employees, PSM team reference and 
auditing purpose as refer to „Evidence location‟ column. The end users ensure 
completeness of written procedure through „Complete‟ and „Incomplete‟ checkboxes. 
These columns are important as they specify which task is yet to be completed and 
therefore requires further action to be taken. For any incomplete tasks, the solution is to 
assign the qualified person to provide the required data through the „Action by‟ and 
„Due date‟ columns. Therefore the tasks is properly monitored and completed within the 
given time. 
 
In this case, MI written procedure for vessel is located at C:\MIMS\Database\V-
5\20511_Guideline_Pressure_Vessel.doc. Basically this document explained the need 
for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of pressure vessels as established by 




Figure 8: MI written procedure in MIMS for V-5. 
 
4.3.1.3     MI Training 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(3)  
 
Training is said to be an important ingredient of an effective MI program. By 
having a proper and adequate training program, it ensures that only qualified personnel 
perform MI tasks. Consistent training that assigned to the personnel is capable in 
reducing the human errors that lead to catastrophic accidents.  Each existing and new 
hired employees should attend the training program to ensure the task is done in a 
correct and safe manner. Once the MI training is conducted to the employees, evaluation 
for the training should be performed to evaluate the skills/ knowledge gain by the 
employees in handling any required task in the process plant. Training can be a 
successful platform in determining the skill and knowledge areas required for 
improvement.  
 
By having this system, the end users  can monitor the training required for 
process maintenance for all the employees involved. It can be monitored by listing out 
all the required trainings depend on the focus groups and trace all the attended and yet to 
attend training for each employee. The interface of MI training is displayed in the Figure 
9. The first layer of the training interface consist of „Staff no‟, „Name‟, „Required 
training by‟, „Complete‟, „Incomplete‟, „Remarks‟ and „Schedule‟ column. „Required 
training by‟ column is filled with the position of the trainee and it is hyperlink to the list 





Figure 8: MI Training in MIMS for V-5 
Figure 9: MI Training in MIMS for V-5 
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Based on Figure 9, list of training tab consists of „Requirement‟, „List of 
training‟, „Approved by‟, „Evidence location‟, „Complete‟, „Incomplete‟, „Frequency‟ 
and „Remarks‟ column. This tab is to manage what kinds of training needs to be 
attended by affected employees and the materials of the trainings have to be available in 
„Evidence location‟ for the ease of managing the training process. PSM has outlined 3 
category of MI training to maintain the mechanical integrity of the equipment. The 
category of the training is listed in the „Requirement‟ column. The trainings are divided 
into Process Overview, Related Hazards and Mechanical integrity and Maintenance 
procedure. Since there are several trainings organized for each category, the function of 
„List of training‟ column is to identify the related training to that specific category. 
 
For demonstration, list of training for maintenance technician is tabulated in 
Figure 9 as referred to Maintenance technician tab. Generally, training related to Process 
Overview involved plant process and chemistry. The training need to be refreshed when 
the new process is added or every three years, whichever is less. For Related Hazards, 
the scope of the training covers hazard exposure and control measure, personnel 
protective equipment, emergency response and basically related to Health, Safety & 
Environment Management System (HSEMS) training. Some of the training needs to be 
revised on annual basis according to the plant practices. For Mechanical integrity and 
Maintenance procedure, it covers overview of MI program, detail MI procedures and 
specific procedures for the performance of MI. For this plant, all these trainings are 
refreshed when new procedures are issued or existing procedures are revised.  
 
In this case study, some of the documents for the training organized to the 
maintenance technicians are not available. This system helps to discover the identified 
gaps for training element using the checklist method. Once the gaps are identified, the 
end users can overcome the gaps by providing all the documents so that the training 
program are effectively conducted and easily meet its objectives. Besides, availability of 




According to 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(3), the employer should train each employee 
involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of the equipment. Hence, MIMS is 
designed to trace all the training needed for every each employee as shown in Figure 10. 
MI documentation interface consists of „Attended training‟, „From date‟, „To date, 
„Evaluation description‟ „Evidence location‟ „Remarks‟ and „Refresh date‟.  
 
For this case, the compiled MI training information is assessed to one of the 
maintenance technician. Overall status of attended the required training is directly 
identified from checkbox system and lacking of accomplishment is noted at „Remarks‟ 
columns. He has another two mandatory training need to be completed including 
Pressure Vessel Inspection (PVI) and Risk- Based Inspection (RBI) trainings. For any 
incomplete training, the employee should be prohibited to attend any equipment by 
himself to avoid any unwanted accident happen. The „Schedule‟ column in Figure 9 
functioned to inform the affected personnel on the date of training to be attended. By 
having the schedule embedded within the MIMS, problem of absenteeism due to 
overlook of the date of training can be prevented. 
 
The proof of the attended training is compiled and tracked as refer to „evidence 
location‟ column either in softcopy or hardcopy version. The training documentation for 
staff no. 1000260 is referred to Figure 10. Out of 7 attended trainings, only 3 
documentations are available. Figure 11 shows Standard Operating procedure (SOP) 
evaluation and certification for Authorised Entrant & Stanby Person (AESP) and 
Authorised gas tester (AGT) is shown in Figure 12. The 'Refresh date' column in the 
training documentation of MIMS in Figure 10 makes the planning process easier by 
providing the latest update on attended trainings. Then, the training scheduler can 













Figure 12: Sample of „Certification for Authorised Entrant & Stanby Person 
(AESP) and Authorised gas tester (AGT)‟ 
32 
 
4.3.1.4     MI Inspection & Testing 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(i-iv) 
 
Referring to the framework in Figure 3, there are several sub-standards of MI 
inspection and testing that need to be fulfilled in order to comply with the PSM standard. 
Figure 13 shows the interface of MIMS for inspection & testing with „Sub-standard‟, 
„Requirement‟, „Description, „Evidence location‟, „Complete‟, „Incomplete‟, „Remarks‟, 
„Action by‟ and „Due date‟ columns. The listed sub-standards CFR 1910.119 (j) (4)(i-iv) 
in this interface provide guideline to end users about important information that need to 
be compiled. MIMS gives flexibility to the end user on how they would carry out the 
inspection and testing to the equipment as long as they comply with the standard by 
performing the inspection on process equipment, procedures of the inspection followed 
RAGAGEPs, frequency of the inspection and test consistent with manufacturer 
recommendations and RAGAGEPs and last but not least each of performed inspection is 
documented as described in the „Description‟ column. 
  
In this case, all four sub-standards of MI inspection and testing for V-5 complies 
with the PSM requirement as indicate by the „Complete‟ checkbox.  „Action by‟ and 
„Due date‟ columns work similarly like in other interfaces as to convey solution for any 
incomplete tasks. Inspection Reference Plan document is located at 
C:\MIMS\Database\V-5\Inspection reference plan.pdf stated that the inspection and 
testing is carried out to the filter which categorized under pressure vessel and storage 
tank process equipment. The Reference Plan for V-5 is illustrated in Figure 14. The 
procedure for the inspection follows the established Internal Technical Standard (ITS) of 
plant X which is one of the RAGAGEPs.  
  
The frequency of the inspection is following API 510 for internal and external 
inspection. According to API 510, the period between internal inspections shall not 
exceed one half of the remaining life of the vessel or 10 years, whichever is less 
meanwhile the interval for external inspection does not exceed the lesser of 5 years or 
the required internal inspection. The frequency is believed to be consistence with the 
RAGAGEPs as the previous inspection is done for about 2 ½ years beforehand which 
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means that it is still not exceeded the recommended interval. On the other hand, the 
inspection and testing is documented in title „Inspection Report Summary‟ which 
available at C:\MIMS\Database\V-5\Inspection report summary.pdf  as shown in Figure 15 
and Figure 16 respectively.  
 
 





















Figure 16: Parts of Inspection Report Summary (b) for V-5 
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4.3.1.5     MI Equipment Deficiencies 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(5)  
 
A deficiency is noted when an observed condition is outside the established 
limits (acceptance criteria) that define equipment integrity. According CCPS, 2006 [9], 
deficient equipment condition can be discovered; (1) during acceptance testing for new 
equipment fabrication or installation, (2) during performing inspection, testing and 
preventive maintenance activities, or (3) while measurements are taken when the 
equipment is accessible during a repair.  The equipment deficiency can be managed 
effectively by allowing the following action to occur [16]: 
i. Identify deficient conditions 
ii. Ensuring proper responses to deficient 
iii. Communicating the equipment deficiencies to affected personal 
iv. Ensuring  timely correction of deficient conditions 
To illustrate the requirements, Figure 17 shows the equipment deficiencies interface in 
MIMS for 29 CFR1910.119(j)(5) consists of „Status‟, „Deficiency‟, „Required Action‟, 
„Action by‟, „Verified by‟, „Date assess‟, „Date return to service‟, „Complete‟, 
„Incomplete‟ and „Remarks‟ columns. 
 
„Status‟ column is created in the MIMS to distinguish in what mode the 
equipment is whether in online or offline (shutdown) mode before proceeding with any 
action. The MI equipment deficiency is also monitored by figuring out the deficiency of 
the equipment during inspections performed and assigning the respective personnel to 
correct the deficiency. Any action assigned to the employee should be verified by 
qualified authorities in most of the cases is Engineer Manager.  „Date access‟ and „Date 
return to service‟ columns can notify the responsible personnel to ensure the equipment 
is corrected and it is available to handover to the operation side or its normal service 
within the specified time.  
 
 Based on the inspection report there is no abnormalities of V-5 that identified as 
outside acceptable limit. According to this kind of situation, the end users can tick in 




Figure 17: MI equipment deficiencies in MIMS for V-5 
 
 
4.3.1.6     MI Quality Assurance (QA) 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(6)(i-iii)  
 
Quality Assurance (QA) considers the quality of equipment from the time it is 
designed until the time it is taken out of service; for retirement or reuse [9]. QA 
specifically refers to new equipment [17]. The QA can be addressed at various stages in 
process life which means that it can be classified into three principals area; i) fabrication, 
ii) installation and iii) maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment [18]. Figure 18 
shows the interface of MI Quality Assurance (QA) of MIMS with „Sub-standard‟, 
„Requirements‟, „Description‟, „Evidence location‟ and „Remarks‟ columns. The 29 
CFR 1910.119(j)(6)(i-iii) sub-standard in the interface act as guideline to end users 
about vital action and documentation that need be done.  
There are 3 sub-standards that needed to be fulfilled in managing the MI quality 
assurance of new equipment. The listed sub-standards determined the requirement that 
needed to be access to the new equipment so that they are suitable or acceptable to be 
used for process application. In this case, V-5 is determined as existing equipment, 
therefore there is no requirement to check for the QA as stated in framework in Figure 3. 
Once the equipment is defined as existing equipment; means it is already in service for 
any years, it does not has to go through QA but it needs to fulfill the other outlined MI 
sub-standards by PSM. QA is applicable only for new equipment that wishes to be 
installed or introduced in the process industries. For this case, the end users will notified 
the affected plant personnel by fill in the „Description‟ column as not applicable with 








4.3.2 Case Study 2: Desalter Water Booster Pump (P-2)  
 
Another case study was conducted involving Desalter Water Booster Pump with 
tag no. P-2. P-2 is a centrifugal pump and it was designated to transfer liquid, inversely 
with compressor as the medium is normally in the form of vapor or gas. In this plant, the 
crude oil will undergo a refine process to remove salt from the crude oil through one of 
the process unit called as desalter. In removing the salt, it needs to be dissolved in the 
water in the crude oil. For the 2
nd 
stage of desalting, the water used is stripped sour water 
from Sour Water Treatment Unit (SWTU), which is pumped by P-2 under flow control 
in the Desalter Water Surge Drum, V-2. The discharged from the Pump P-2 will undergo 
heat exchange before entering 2
nd
 Stage Desalter, V-2-1. The study node in P&ID is 
shown in Figure 19. 
  
This case is the example of process application that fall under new equipment 
category.  Since it is categorized as the new equipment, it must covered 2 sub-standards 
which is CFR 1910.119(j)(1) and CFR 1910.119(j)(6) (i-iii) highlighting  process 
application and QA respectively. However, for the next cycle of inspection, it has to 
undergo the same process with the existing equipment and complete all the requirements 












4.3.2.1     MI Application 29 CFR 1910.119 (j) (1)  
 
„Pumps‟ is included in the PSM-covered process application of 29 CFR 
1910.119(j)(1)(vi) sub-standard. However „Pumps‟ absolutely do not focus on the 
pumps only.  It includes all rotating machinery like compressors, fans, blowers as well 
as agitators. Basically, the function of MI application interface is similar to the previous 
case study (section 4.3.1.1) except the P-2 is grouped under „Pumps‟ process 
application. The interface for MI application of the pump P-2 is shown in Figure 20.  
 
 
Figure 20: MI application in MIMS for P-2 
 
 
4.3.2.2     MI Quality Assurance (QA) 29 CFR 1910.119(j)(6)(i-iii) 
 
The framework of MI management to fulfill 29 CFR 1910.119(j) in Figure 3 is 
applicable for any equipment under specified process application. According to 
framework, once the identified equipment is covered in one of the process application, 
the next step is to justify whether it existing or new equipment. For this case, the pump 
is categorized as new equipment. For any new equipment, it has to undergo QA check 
before it can be installed in the process plant. Ultimately, this case study is to emphasize 
more on QA as it is applicable for new equipment only and to show how interface for 
QA works since it does not applicable in the previous case study.  Figure 21 shows QA 




Figure 21: MI Quality Assurance (QA) in MIMS for P-2 
 
 
In this case study, all the QA requirements of the P-2 are comply with the PSM 
requirements. The employers have the responsibility to ensure that the PSM-covered 
equipment is designed, purchased, fabricated and commissioned properly and these 
processes are controlled and documented for good. Generally, QA documents can be 
obtained from the suppliers or manufacturers once the new equipment is bought. The 
first QA requirement which is to assure equipment as fabricated is suitable for process 
application was identified in P-2 datasheet. The documentation is located at 
C:\MIMS\Database\P-2\QA P-2 datasheet.docx. Part of the document is disclosed in 
Figure 22. According to the document, it stated that the P-2 is fabricated almost 
completely same with the order specification and indicate that the pump is suitable for 
process application for which it may be used.  
 
In addition, appropriate QA check and inspection shall be performed as required 
in CFR 1910.119 (j) (6) (ii). MIMS captured written information of check and 
inspection, and spare part record for P-2. The information is stored at 
C:\MIMS\Database\P-2\QA P-2 check and inspection.docx, and C:\MIMS\Database\P-
2\QA P-2 spare part.docx. as shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24 respectively. From the 
















4.3.3 Overall findings of case studies 
Table 5 shows the overall findings of the case studies conducted at Refinery X 
based on the MI requirements. It represents the identified gaps and actions to be taken 
by the end users for every each of MI sub-standards starting from CFR 1910.119 (j) (1) 
until CFR 1910.119(j) (6). From the table, it shows that only one of the MI sub-
standards of the company which is MI training CFR 1910.119 (j) (3) did not comply 
with PSM standard. Details of the findings are presented in the Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Overall findings of case studies 
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CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
This present study introduced a structured technique for easy implementation and 
management of mechanical integrity at a process plant in order to comply with MI 29 
CFR 1910.119(j) requirements. The framework was developed as a guide for the 
employer to manage the MI and determine the gaps and solutions in a systematic ways. 
The technique uses P&ID as a foundation in tracking and managing the data as it 
prevents missing of MI program perform to the related equipment since the P&ID 
contain details of any equipment involved in the process plant.  
 
MIMS is a developed prototype database management system based on the 
proposed concept for easy implementation and explanation. Following all the systematic 
approach as described in the system, the end users are capable to determine the gaps for 
improvement in term of safety as well as for smooth plant operation. By knowing where 
the weakness exists allows a facility to develop or address the greatest MI needs. 
Implementation of this technique will help industries to ensure the equipment integrity 
and control process hazards that could prevent major accidents such as fire, explosion 
and toxic releases and compliance with PSM regulation. Besides, a well implemented 
MI system ensures that the people, assets and surrounding environment are not adversely 
affected by inadequate evaluation of hazards, threats and other potential undesired 







For future recommendation, in upgrading the system, continuous research of MI 
program should be done within a longer time frame so that it provides more impactful 
result to the system and discover full ability or strength of the system. Once the database 
system is proven to be manageable by the end users, it can be implemented in process 
industries as the best way to manage the MI of the company in order to assure high level 
of safety is practiced as intended and lead to no accidents. 
 
 Besides, other elements of PSM are encouraged to follow the introduced 
technique used by MIMS in order to comply with overall PSM requirements. Last but 
not least, to integrate the other 13 PSM elements into a centralized database system to 
obtain complete integration of PSM program and completely prevent any hazards related 
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